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Abstract 
 
Research on how economic factors affect attitudes toward immigration often focuses on labor 
market effects, concluding that, because workers’ skill levels do not predict opposition to low- 
versus highly skilled immigration, economic self-interest does not shape policy attitudes. We 
conduct a new survey to measure beliefs about a range of economic, political, and cultural 
consequences of immigration. When economic self-interest is broadened to include concerns 
about the fiscal burdens created by immigration, beliefs about these economic effects strongly 
correlate with immigration attitudes and explain a significant share of the difference in support 
for highly versus low-skilled immigration. Our results suggest that previous work underestimates 
the importance of economic self-interest as a source of immigration policy preferences and 
attitudes more generally. 
 
 
 
Keywords: self-interest; immigration; public opinion; political economy; cultural threat 
 
Author’s Note: Replication data for this article can be viewed at huber.research.yale.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
A large body of research reveals that Americans’ attitudes toward increased legal 
immigration are a function of whether the immigrants in question are highly skilled or low-
skilled (Goldstein and Peters 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010; Hainmueller and 
Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller et al. 2015; Iyengar et al. 2013; Malhotra et al. 2013; Sniderman et 
al. 2004). Across studies, the American public is substantially more supportive of admitting 
additional highly skilled immigrants than admitting additional low-skilled immigrants. However, 
the reason for this difference in attitudes is not clear. 
In an important recent study, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) argue that the strong 
preference for highly skilled immigrants seen among both low- and highly skilled respondents 
shows that highly skilled American workers—those whose wages are expected to be most 
adversely affected by additional highly skilled immigrants—do not act in their economic self-
interest. While this conclusion is consistent with their data, we argue that without direct 
measurement of individuals’ perceptions of both the labor market threat and other potential 
economic consequences posed by these types of immigrants it is premature to rule out economic 
self-interest as an explanation for observed policy preferences. More specifically, until we know 
citizens’ beliefs about all of the different economic pathways by which expanding highly skilled 
or low-skilled immigration may affect them, we cannot assess the extent to which immigration 
policy preferences are related to economic self-interest. 
Building on public opinion research that measures economic concerns, this paper presents 
results from a novel new survey of Americans’ beliefs about the consequences of immigration 
and immigration policy. In a survey experimental design, we measure respondents’ policy 
preferences about admitting highly skilled and low-skilled immigrants, as well as their beliefs 
about the multiple potential economic consequences of admitting additional immigrants of a 
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particular skill level—not only labor market effects, but also effects on household tax burdens, 
access to government services, and the costs of goods and services that households consume. 
Additionally, we ask a variety of questions about the perceived cultural and social consequences 
of immigration, which permits an analysis of the relative predictive power of personal economic, 
sociotropic, and cultural factors. Overall, these new data allow us to understand differences in 
how Americans perceive immigrants of particular skill levels, as well as how those perceptions 
correlate with policy attitudes toward admitting specific types of immigrants. 
Our analyses reveal several important patterns not previously explored. First, attitudes 
toward additional immigrants depend on a respondent’s own skill level. In accordance with most 
basic economic accounts (Borjas 2003; Borjas et al. 1996), low-skilled workers perceive a 
greater threat to their wages and employment from low-skilled than highly skilled immigrants, 
while highly skilled workers perceive a greater threat from highly skilled immigrants.1 When 
measured directly, respondents appear to understand the likely labor market consequences of 
different types of immigrants. 
Second, for all dimensions of economic consequences apart from the labor market, 
Americans believe low-skilled immigrants will be worse for their households than highly skilled 
immigrants. Once we measure beliefs about the full range of potential economic effects of 
immigration, the preferences of highly skilled respondents for highly rather than low-skilled 
immigrants appears consistent with perceived economic self-interest.2 Although others have 
examined economic influences outside of the labor market, this paper is to our knowledge the 
first to measure citizen perceptions of all of these factors.3 Thus, despite perceiving similarly 
skilled immigrants as more threatening to their labor market positions, differences across 
individuals in negative assessments of the overall household economic effects of low-skilled 
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immigration are more strongly correlated with fears about their fiscal burden for both highly and 
low-skilled respondents. 
Third, measures of perceived economic self-interest correlate with attitudes toward 
immigration policy and, in part, explain differences in support for admitting additional highly or 
low-skilled immigrants. While our reliance on survey data requires us to exercise caution when 
describing the relationship between beliefs and policy attitudes as causal, we continue to find 
that these perceptions explain policy attitudes after accounting for cultural and sociotropic 
concerns. Overall, although cultural fears and sociotropic economic factors play an important 
role in explaining immigration attitudes, personal economic concerns are also valuable for 
understanding variation across both individuals and types of immigrants in support for additional 
immigration. 
This work contributes to the literature about the role of self-interest and symbolic 
considerations in shaping immigration policy attitudes. Some previous research has concluded 
that economic self-interest plays little role in explaining mass attitudes toward immigration 
(Burns and Gimpel 2000; Card et al. 2011; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller et al. 2015; 
Iyengar et al. 2013; McClaren and Johnson 2007; but see Malhotra et al 2013), a finding that is 
adduced as evidence that economic self-interest fails to explain mass attitudes toward public 
policy more generally (but see Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Our findings suggest that one reason 
for the apparent small role of self-interest in explaining immigration policy attitudes may be 
measurement problems. When economic self-interest is not confined to labor market concerns 
alone, beliefs about economic effects play a larger role in our understanding of citizen attitudes 
about immigration than previously documented. 
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Our results also provide guidance for policymakers. In particular, politicians and elites 
must grapple with the fact that citizens have beliefs not only about the labor market and cultural 
effects of immigration, but also about its non-labor market economic consequences. Dancygier 
(2010) highlights the key role of local economic considerations in explaining immigration policy 
conflict in Europe, and several U.S. studies (e.g., Hopkins 2010; Newman 2013) point to the role 
of changing local demographics in exacerbating local anti-immigrant concerns. Our work shows 
that Americans appear to distinguish between low- and highly skilled immigrants in forming 
their beliefs about these other effects. Additionally, these data may help us understand the reason 
that changing local conditions have large effects, because the effects of new immigrants on local 
service use and access to existing services are likely readily visible to many natives. 
Finally, and most generally, theoretical models of economic self-interest rest on the 
critical assumption that agents understand their own respective roles in the economy. However, 
past studies that assess the efficacy of economic models as they relate to immigration policy 
attitudes and other domains often rely on proxies of perceived economic self-interest rather than 
citizens’ subjective perceptions of the ways in which policy can affect personal economic 
concerns. Our argument is that an appropriate measurement of economic self-interest must assess 
citizens’ beliefs about their personal economic situations across the multiple dimensions in which 
policy can affect economic wellbeing. In other policy domains, where efforts are made to 
distinguish economic self-interest from other explanations for policy preferences, a key task is 
therefore to measure beliefs about the myriad ways that policy can shape self-interest. That is, 
scholars must measure beliefs about how the mechanisms they propose are affected by 
interventions in order to properly evaluate those models. 
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Economic Self-Interest and Immigration Policy Attitudes 
We seek to understand how Americans’ views about immigration policy are shaped by their 
understandings of the personal economic effects of admitting additional immigrants. Prior 
research suggests four pathways by which immigration can affect personal economic conditions 
that likely vary depending both on the type of immigrant in question—highly or low-skilled—
and the skill level of the respondent. We briefly review those arguments and show that despite 
this rich theoretical literature, no prior work directly measures citizens’ beliefs about these 
different economic effects or examines how heterogeneity in citizen and immigrant skill levels 
relates to these perceptions.4 
First, immigration may affect labor market prospects. In the most straightforward 
economic account, the factor proportions model with a closed economy (Borjas 2003; Borjas et 
al. 1996), citizens face greater labor market threat from similarly skilled immigrants. These 
immigrants increase the supply of available workers at that skill level, resulting in lower wages 
and greater unemployment for current workers. Immigrants of a different skill level, by contrast, 
should either have no effect on the worker or actually increase the relative demand for her labor, 
thereby improving her economic prospects. These predictions yield mixed empirical support and 
are sensitive to assumptions about the nature of the economy (Leamer and Levinsohn 1995; 
Orrenius and Zavodny 2007). 
Second, immigration may increase tax burdens. Although the empirical research is 
ambiguous (Fix et al. 1994; Smith and Edmonston 1997), some respondents might reason that 
low-skilled immigrants are a greater financial burden than highly skilled immigrants because the 
former are expected to pay less in taxes, especially at the state and local levels (Hanson et al. 
2007; Smith and Edmonston 1997), and/or consume more in government services. Assuming the 
government maintains a constant level of per capita service and redistribution, the cost of serving 
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additional immigrants is likely to lead to higher taxes. If taxes are progressive, this increased 
fiscal burden will fall more heavily on the wealthy, who tend to be highly skilled. However, if 
the taxes in question are local, residential sorting by class may mean the burden instead falls on 
lower income individuals. 
Third, immigration may affect access to existing government services through crowding 
(Dancygier 2010; Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hanson et al. 2007). This occurs if immigrants 
consume government services whose funding is not increased sufficiently to accommodate 
growing use. Crowding may take place, for example, in local schools and access to basic social 
services, which low-skilled immigrants likely consume at higher rates than highly skilled 
immigrants (who can also likely support, through their taxes, expansion of those services; 
Facchini and Mayda 2009). If the crowding is focused on services that low-income citizens use, 
concerns about crowding should be greatest for low-skilled citizens. 
Finally, immigration may affect the costs of goods and services that households consume 
by altering labor costs. Assuming that immigration reduces the costs of certain goods, whether 
those reductions improve overall household purchasing power depends on whether the goods are 
consumed by a household as well as whether the cost savings are offset by an increase in prices 
due to increased demand for goods that immigrants consume. Empirically, it appears that low-
skilled immigration improves the net purchasing power of high-income citizens, but decreases it 
for low-income citizens (Cortes 2008). To the extent that income levels track skill levels, low-
skilled citizens encounter greater potential negative price consequences from low-skilled 
immigration than do highly skilled citizens. The effect on prices of highly skilled immigration is 
less clear. 
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Previous work has sought to estimate the effects of these different factors on immigration 
attitudes using contextual measures such as unemployment rates, state fiscal burdens, welfare 
expenditures, or exposure to costs related to immigration5 (e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; 
Hanson et al. 2007; Tingley 2013). Although this measurement strategy generates important 
insights, the use of objective economic indicators to explain variation in citizens’ beliefs about 
the effects of immigration policy on their economic standing requires the untested assumption 
that those beliefs align with indicators of their tax burden, access to government services, and the 
costs of goods and services. Another concern is measurement error, which may arise if the proxy 
measures do not capture important differences across individuals and localities in exposure to 
these economic effects. In light of these concerns, we suggest it is desirable to instead measure 
perceptions directly.6 
Prior research on the economic determinants of immigration attitudes is summarized in 
Table 1. Three important limitations of this literature are especially prominent. First, column (A) 
shows that, despite the large body of work detailing how immigration might affect the economic 
wellbeing of citizens of different skill levels, previous research rarely asks respondents about 
their perceptions of these consequences, and no studies measure individuals’ beliefs about all 
four of the ways we elaborate for how immigration may affect personal economic standing. 
Instead, many studies only ask about general policy attitudes or effects for the entire nation. 
Sniderman et al. (2004) do distinguish personal economic effects from sociotropic effects, but 
they measure total economic threat to a respondent with a single item. Second, column (B) 
reveals that only four studies directly ask about respondents’ relative policy preferences for both 
highly and low-skilled immigrants, and none also include measures of the anticipated cultural 
and sociotropic economic effects of admitting each type of immigrant (see column (C)). Third, as 
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noted in column (D), no studies measure respondents’ assessments of their own labor market 
skill levels. Instead, prior work relies on indirect measurement, including education, income, the 
industry of employment or occupation, or ease of finding employment.  
[Table 1 Here] 
These omissions may explain why prior work (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010; 
Hainmueller et al. 2015; Iyengar et al. 2013) generally concludes that citizens do not respond to 
different types of immigrants in a manner consistent with their economic self-interest (but see 
Malhotra et al. 2013). These analyses focus on the assumption that greater labor market threat 
from similarly skilled immigrants should explain variation in attitudes across citizen and 
immigrant types toward changes in immigration policy. But why, in light of economic theory, do 
highly skilled individuals express greater opposition to low-skilled immigrants? There are at 
least three possibilities. 
First, economic self-interest could play little role in immigration attitudes (the conclusion 
reached in prior work). Second, citizens might be acting in their perceived self-interest, but could 
have different beliefs about the labor market consequences of immigration than those implied by 
economic theory. Third, citizens could care a great deal about the economic effects for their 
households, but focus on economic consequences other than labor market effects. Given the 
designs of the previous studies highlighted in Table 1, however, we cannot adjudicate among 
these explanations with currently available evidence. In particular, it is impossible to reject self-
interest as an explanation for immigration policy attitudes, or more generally to distinguish 
among the various theoretical alternatives noted earlier. 
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Non-Economic Sources of Immigration Attitudes 
Our discussion thus far has focused on the ways that immigration can affect individuals’ 
economic well-being, both objectively and as subjectively perceived. Economic factors alone, 
however, do not explain attitudes toward immigration. For example, various results from the 
literature indicate that measures of prejudice (Stephan et al. 1999) and views about national 
identity (Sniderman et al. 2004) predict anti-immigrant attitudes, that cultural cues can 
strengthen anti-immigrant attitudes (Brader et al. 2008; Valentino et al. 2013), and that 
experimental manipulations that decrease the likelihood of a particular immigrant fitting in can 
further depress support (see Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014 for an extensive review of the effects 
of cultural concerns on immigration attitudes). 
This research raises the concern that perceptions of economic threat might be affected by 
the perceived cultural threat of different types of immigrants. In light of this possibility, the 
survey we designed seeks to directly measure the perceived cultural and symbolic threats of both 
highly and low-skilled immigrants. While we cannot rule out the possibility that cultural threat 
affects measured personal economic threat, this allows us to test whether any observed 
correlations between perceived personal economic effects and immigration policy attitudes are 
affected by including measures of cultural concerns. 
Data 
To address the limitations of previous research examining American attitudes toward highly and 
low-skilled immigrants, we undertook a survey of Americans’ attitudes toward immigration 
policy. Three key features distinguish this survey from prior work. First, this is the only survey 
of which we are aware that measures economic beliefs about the four different personal 
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economic consequences of immigrants discussed above, allowing for a richer understanding of 
the contours of citizen beliefs about those consequences. To help distinguish personal economic 
concerns from other factors in explaining policy attitudes, we also measure citizens’ beliefs 
about the sociotropic effects and non-economic (cultural) consequences of admitting immigrants. 
Second, we measure these beliefs and overall immigration policy preferences for different types 
of immigrants, so as to directly assess how citizens understand their personal economic 
wellbeing will be affected by immigrants with different skill levels. Finally, we measure 
respondents’ assessments of their own skill levels with the same language used to determine their 
policy opinions about different types of immigrants. 
Our survey was fielded by YouGov/Polimetrix from September 7-16, 2013. Our final 
dataset includes 2000 completed surveys. All analyses use analytic weights.7 
Survey design details and exact wording of all questions appear in the Supplemental 
Appendix. In brief, after assessing their own labor market skill levels, approximately 70% of 
respondents received a three-question battery asking their support for increasing the number of 
immigrants allowed to enter the United States in general and for both “highly skilled” and “low-
skilled” immigrants (the remaining 30% were asked these questions at the end of the survey).8, 9 
Following a set of questions not related to immigration, respondents were randomly assigned to 
an identical battery of questions about the consequences of general immigration (10%), highly 
skilled immigration (45%), or low-skilled immigration (45%). These questions asked 
respondents to assess the effects of admitting additional immigrants of the randomly assigned 
type for their households’ economic standing, as well as the consequences to American culture 
and the economy as a whole. These questions serve as the basis for the analyses.10 
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Attitudes about the Personal Economic Effects of Admitting Immigrants 
What do citizens think are the economic consequences of admitting additional immigrants, and 
do those attitudes differ depending on those immigrants’ skill levels? Here we discuss how 
citizens believe that immigration will affect four dimensions of household economic wellbeing: 
labor market competition, taxes (fiscal burden), access to existing government services 
(crowding), and the costs of goods and services. We present data on attitudes about these 
economic effects from admitting additional highly and low-skilled immigrants.11 Our analysis 
proceeds in three stages. We first examine the average respondent’s evaluation of different types 
of immigrants and correlate their views about the different dimensions of economic effects with 
overall assessments of economic outcomes.12 This analysis reveals that beliefs about the effects 
of immigration on taxes, service availability, and the costs of goods and services households 
consume drive economic fears about low-skilled immigrants. In stage 2, we repeat this process. 
partitioning the analyses by respondent skill level, and find that citizens do perceive greater labor 
market competition from similarly skilled immigrants. For highly skilled respondents, these 
labor market concerns, to a degree, offset the other sources of negative views about the effects of 
low-skilled immigrants. Finally, in stage 3 we assess the relative importance of personal 
economic circumstances vis-à-vis sociotropic and cultural concerns in understanding evaluations 
of immigrants of different skill levels. 
Stage 1: Average evaluations of immigrants by immigrant skill level 
We begin by plotting in Figure 1 beliefs about each of the four dimensions of economic 
effects and overall household economic consequences. In each case, respondents chose from five 
response options, which we rescale to range linearly from 0 (the most positive consequences) to 
1 (the most negative).13 Each pair of bars presents average assessments of the likelihood that 
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each outcome would occur after admitting additional highly skilled (dark grey bars) or low-
skilled (light grey bars) immigrants, while the capped vertical lines represent 95% confidence 
intervals. Because .5 indicates a neutral response, responses with confidence intervals that do not 
overlap .5 indicate statistically significant net agreement (p<.05).14 Above each pair of bars is the 
p-value for a test of whether the average response for those in the highly skilled immigrant 
condition is different from those in the low-skilled condition. To guard against the possibility 
that individuals in the labor market respond differently than those who are not, we restrict 
analysis for the wage/job loss item to the subsample of those in a household in the labor market 
(i.e., with either the respondent or his or her spouse/partner working or looking for work), which 
we denote the labor market subsample.  
[Figure 1 Here] 
The leftmost pair of bars reveals that, on average, respondents believe that admitting 
additional immigrants, whether highly or low-skilled, increases the chances that someone in their 
household will experience job or wage loss. Both estimates are statistically distinguishable from 
the neutral response but not each other (p=.47). In contrast, while citizens on average believe that 
both types of immigrants will result in higher taxes, reduce access to government programs, and 
increase the costs of goods and services, respondents perceive greater personal economic threat 
from low-skilled immigrants for each of these economic dimensions (all p<.01). As such, it is 
not surprising that overall assessments of the household economic effects of additional highly 
skilled and low-skilled immigrants (the rightmost pair of bars) are negative, but substantially 
more so for admitting low-skilled immigrants (p<.001). Thus, despite general pessimism about 
the economic effects of additional immigrants for their own households, regardless of those 
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immigrants’ skill levels, the labor market is the one area where respondents report fears that are, 
on average, not greater for low- rather than highly skilled immigrants. 
Given the patterns in Figure 1, our next question is which of the four separate channels of 
economic influence are most important in shaping overall assessments of the personal economic 
consequences of immigration. One informal way to assess this is to predict the summary measure 
of economic consequences using the four dimensions individually. We present this model in 
Table 2. Formally, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the following 
specification: 
Overall Economic Consequence of Immigrant Type T = B0 + B1×Labor Market Effects of 
T + B2×Tax Effects of T + B3×Crowding Effects of T + B4×Cost Effects of T + γ×C + e, 
where C is a vector of demographic and individual-level covariates. We estimate separate models 
for respondents randomly assigned to be asked about the four economic dimensions for either 
highly or low-skilled immigrants. 
To ensure that labor market concerns are a reasonable consideration, the analyses in 
Table 2 are limited to the labor market subsample.15 In column (1), where the outcome variable 
is overall assessments about the effects of admitting highly skilled immigrants, the regression 
assigns similar weight (estimates of .262 and .249, respectively) to attitudes about the labor 
market and tax consequences. Attitudes about access to existing government services and the 
costs of goods and services are far less meaningful, statistically or substantively. Repeating this 
analysis in column (2) using standardized measures (so that the attitudinal measures have mean 0 
and standard deviation 1) to address differences in the variances of distinct items, we find similar 
results (the estimate for tax consequences is similar, but for the labor market measure it increases 
by about 27%). With respect to low-skilled immigrants, parallel results in columns (3) and (4) 
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reveal that the strongest predictor of the summary measure of economic effects is beliefs about 
tax consequences. Each unit change in tax attitudes is associated with slightly less than a half-
unit move in the overall economic effects evaluation, all else equal. By contrast, the next largest 
coefficient estimate, for labor market competition, is approximately 70% smaller (column (4)).  
[Table 2 Here] 
It appears therefore that greater aggregate opposition to low-skilled than highly skilled 
immigrants does not arise due to large average differences in perceptions of the labor market 
consequences for these different types of immigrants. Instead (as illustrated in Figure 1), 
economic attitudes diverge most sharply on beliefs about the other economic consequences of 
immigrants not often assessed: taxes, services, and household costs. The effects on overall 
economic assessments of fiscal concerns are very large for attitudes about low-skilled 
immigrants, and more than one-and-a-half times what is estimated for highly skilled immigrants. 
Perceptions about labor market competition, by contrast, have over twice the estimated effect for 
attitudes about highly skilled than low-skilled immigrants, but the absolute size of the effect is 
more modest. 
Stage 2: Do Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Workers Anticipate Different Economic Effects? 
Our preceding analysis examines average differences in respondents’ attitudes toward 
low- and highly skilled immigrants. But existing theory suggests that the labor market effects of 
immigration may vary for different types of workers. Therefore, we next take advantage of the 
fact that each respondent was asked to assess his or her own labor market skill level to test 
systematically whether highly and low-skilled respondents anticipate different economic effects 
by type of immigrant. In Figure 2 we repeat the data presentation from Figure 1, except that we 
now divide the sample by respondents’ self-assessed skill levels. Panel A shows the responses of 
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highly skilled citizens, while panel B focuses on low-skilled citizens.16 Several interesting and 
important patterns emerge. 
[Figures 2 Here] 
First, comparing the first pair of columns across panels A and B of Figure 2 suggests that 
low-skilled respondents perceive more labor market threat than highly skilled respondents from 
both types of immigration. The average labor market threat from a highly skilled immigrant is 
.62 for low-skilled respondents but only .56 for highly skilled respondents (p<.05). Similarly, 
with respect to low-skilled immigrants, self-assessed low-skilled respondents have an average 
labor market threat score of .64, compared to only about .52 for highly skilled respondents 
(p<.001). Thus, at least on average, the higher levels of perceived labor market threat from both 
types of immigrants suggests that labor market worries are potentially a greater source of 
opposition to immigration for low- than for highly skilled citizens.17 
Second, and consistent with the predictions of the factor proportions model, both low- 
and highly skilled workers appear to perceive greater labor market competition from immigrants 
of the same skill level. Focusing first on highly-skilled workers (panel A), the average labor 
market threat from highly skilled immigrants is .56 but only .52 from low-skilled immigrants 
(p<.1). By contrast, for low-skilled respondents (panel B) the labor market threat is .64 from 
low-skilled immigrants and .62 from highly skilled immigrants (p=.28). The magnitudes of these 
differences are not large (.04 and .02, respectively), but they are consistent with prior economic 
models.18 Additionally, these differences are larger when we restrict our attention to single-
worker households (out of concern that partners/spouses may have different skill levels than the 
survey respondents themselves).19 
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Third, for outcomes other than labor market competition, both highly and low-skilled 
workers perceive low-skilled immigrants as being a greater economic burden. The clearest 
differences are for taxes, where both groups perceive low-skilled immigrants as being more 
likely to increase their taxes (by about .08 units, both p<.001). We see the same pattern for 
access to government services (p<.05), the costs of goods and services (p=.17), and the overall 
summary measure (p<.05). 
Fourth, predictions about differences in the economic effects of immigration on citizens 
of different skill levels receive mixed support. Comparing across respondent skill levels, highly 
skilled (high-income) individuals are not more concerned about the tax burden posed by low-
skilled immigration (p=.41), nor do they perceive greater benefits in the form of reduced costs of 
goods and services caused by low-skilled immigration (p=.53). There is some evidence, 
however, that low-skilled respondents are more concerned about the crowding effects of low-
skilled immigrants; the average crowding threat score is .66 for low-skilled respondents but only 
.63 for highly skilled respondents (p=.11). Low-skilled respondents also report greater overall 
economic concerns regarding both types of immigrants than their highly skilled counterparts 
(p<.01 across the two skill-level conditions). 
Given this pattern of variation in the assessments of the likely labor market, tax, 
crowding, and service cost effects of immigration across respondent and immigrant skill levels, 
an important remaining question is how beliefs about these different economic effects correlate 
with overall assessments of the personal economic consequences of immigration. To answer this 
question, we continue our earlier examination of how well the component measures of economic 
effects explain beliefs about overall economic effects for the labor market subsample, but 
estimate separate models depending on respondents’ self-assessed skill levels. These analyses 
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appear in columns (5)-(8) of Table 2. In column (5), we find that as with the overall population 
(column (1)), highly skilled respondents’ summary economic assessments of the effects of 
increased highly skilled immigration are most correlated with their beliefs about labor market 
threat and tax consequences (with a one-unit change in these attitudes corresponding to a .22- 
(p<.001) and .25-unit (p<.01) change in evaluations, respectively, all else constant). When the 
immigrants in question are low-skilled (column (6)), however, highly skilled respondents’ 
overall economic views are correlated only with beliefs about tax consequences. 
We perform parallel analyses for self-assessed low-skilled respondents in columns (7) 
and (8). For these respondents, the only factor correlated with overall economic views of highly 
skilled immigrants is beliefs about their labor market effects (p<.001), with a one-unit change in 
this concern altering evaluations by about a third of a unit (see column (7)), all else constant. By 
contrast, among respondents asked about low-skilled immigration (column (8)), one-unit shifts in 
fiscal burden concerns, labor market concerns, and beliefs about crowding in access to 
government services are associated with .41- (p<.001), .25- (p<.001), and .16-unit (p<.01) 
movements in low-skilled respondents’ overall economic assessments, respectively.20 
Thus, for both highly skilled and low-skilled respondents, beliefs about the economic 
consequences of immigration are predicted much more strongly by their concerns about the 
fiscal burden of low-skilled than highly skilled immigrants. We also find evidence that highly 
skilled workers give greater weight to labor market concerns in assessing the personal economic 
effects of admitting highly skilled (as opposed to low-skilled) immigrants. In contrast, however, 
the correlation for low-skilled respondents between their labor market concerns and the overall 
economic outcome measure is similar across immigrant types (the estimate is larger in the highly 
skilled condition but statistically indistinguishable from that in the low-skilled condition).21 
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Stage 3: Do Beliefs about Personal Economic Effects Explain Immigration Policy Attitudes? 
We have found that survey respondents hold distinct views about the economic effects of 
highly skilled and low-skilled immigrants for their households’ economic wellbeing. Further, 
these concerns appear to vary with respondents’ labor market skill levels and predict overall 
expectations about the economic effects of immigration on respondents’ households. But are 
these personal economic concerns important predictors of immigration attitudes? How do the 
effects of personal economics compare to the effects of sociotropic economic evaluations and 
cultural concerns about immigration?  
We attempt to provide (preliminary) answers to these questions in Table 3.22 
Approximately 90% of respondents were asked their opinions about the economic consequences 
of their assigned type of immigration (highly or low-skilled) for the nation as a whole 
(sociotropic assessments). The question’s 5-point response scale is coded to range from 0 to 1, 
with higher values indicating more negative assessments. These same respondents reported their 
views about six anticipated cultural effects of immigration, namely, whether immigrants of their 
assigned type would (1) arrive able to speak English, (2) obey the law, (3) support American 
values, (4) want to become part of American culture, (5) raise their children with American 
values, and (6) be easy for Americans to get along with. Using responses to these questions, we 
constructed a factor score to gauge cultural threat concerns, with higher values pertaining to 
greater cultural threat (rescaled to range from 0 to 1). The components load well onto a single 
factor and generate only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one (3.95). Factor loadings 
range from 0.74 to 0.86.23 To compare the predictive value of a respondent’s self-assessed 
personal economic concerns, sociotropic economic concerns, and cultural concerns in explaining 
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opposition to immigration, we estimate a regression model using OLS. Our baseline regression 
takes the following form: 
Overall Opposition to Immigrant Type T = B0 + B1×Household Economic Effects of T + 
B2×Sociotropic Economic Effects of T + B3×Cultural Threat Index + B4×Survey 
Question Placement + γ×C + e, 
where C is a vector of demographic and individual-level covariates. The binary indicator, Survey 
Question Placement, identifies the approximately 30% of respondents asked the immigration 
policy attitude question at the end of the survey. This allows average survey responses to vary 
with respect to question placement.24 
Initially, we focus on opposition to admitting additional highly skilled immigrants. The 
column (1) specification includes only the measure of overall household economic effects 
(expected economic self-interest), the indicator for whether the respondent provided her opinion 
at the end of the survey, and demographic controls. The coefficient estimate for household 
economic effects is .77 and significant at p<.001.25 In column (2), we include the sociotropic 
economic indicator and cultural threat index and find that the coefficient estimate for personal 
economic effects is reduced but not eliminated. Thus, individual-level variation in expected 
personal economic effects continues to be strongly correlated with variation in individual-level 
opposition to highly skilled immigration. Sociotropic and cultural concerns are also important 
predictors of opposition to immigration (all p<.01). 
[Table 3 Here] 
One concern with the column (2) specification is that variation across individuals in 
immigration policy attitudes and expected economic effects may not relate specifically to 
opposition to highly skilled immigration, but instead from general opposition to immigration. 
That is, the relationship between personal economic standing and policy attitudes may be 
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spurious if general opposition to immigration for non-economic reasons (e.g., ethnoculturalism 
or ingroup bias) produces both a hostile response when asked for an economic assessment as 
well as opposition to additional immigration. Although we previously demonstrated that citizens 
appear to hold distinct views about the economic effects of these two types of immigrants, we 
can also estimate a model in which we add an additional variable that captures a general negative 
attitude toward new immigrants: opposition to admitting the other type of immigrant. Thus, in 
column (3), we include in the regression model respondents’ stated opposition to admitting low-
skilled immigrants. 
Including this measure attenuates the effects of the personal economic, sociotropic 
economic, and cultural concerns. Nonetheless, assessments of personal economic effects remain 
a statistically and substantively important source of policy attitudes, with a one-unit change in 
this evaluation shifting overall immigration support by .09 units (p=.11), all else equal. This is 
even more striking given that 60% of the sample has the same policy views toward highly and 
low-skilled immigrants. For individual respondents, perceptions of personal economic effects 
therefore explain differences in policy preferences for different types of immigrants. 
In columns (4)-(6), we present parallel specifications predicting opposition to low-skilled 
immigration for those assigned to that treatment condition. The pattern of results is highly 
similar to that in columns (1)-(3): Personal economic concerns remain an important predictor of 
policy attitudes when we account for sociotropic economic and cultural measures, as well as for 
policy preferences toward highly skilled immigrants.26 After controlling for these factors, 
increasing one’s assessment that low-skilled immigration will hurt overall household finances 
from its lowest to highest possible value is associated with a .24-unit increase in opposition to 
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admitting more of these types of immigrants into the country (p<.001). Economic self-interest, 
therefore, appears to be an important source of variation in immigration policy attitudes. 
A final question is thus how well differences in understandings about personal economic, 
sociotropic, and cultural effects explain the relatively greater opposition to low-skilled 
immigration in the general population. In column (7), we pool the earlier samples and compare 
average opposition to highly skilled versus low-skilled immigrants. On average, opposition is .14 
units higher toward low- than highly skilled immigrants, conditioning on the other included 
controls. How well is that difference accounted for by individual-level variation in assessments 
of the three measures of personal and social effects that we examine? In the column (8) 
specification, where we include those variables, the estimate is reduced to about .05, 
approximately 67% smaller than in the column (7) specification. Overall, this suggests that a 
simple answer to why Americans have different policy preferences about admitting highly versus 
low-skilled immigrants is that they have distinct beliefs about how these different types of 
immigrants will affect their households, the economy of the country as a whole, and the nation’s 
social fabric. Each of these factors, including economic self-interest, appears to be an important 
source of variation in policy attitudes. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
What explains variation in how Americans react to the prospects of additional highly or low-skilled 
immigrants? Prior work on immigrant skill levels, which generally finds that both highly and low-skilled 
citizens show a strong preference for highly skilled immigrants, is often interpreted as the result of highly 
skilled citizens’ indifference to the economic implications of immigration for their households. Our 
research calls this conclusion into question. Whereas previous work has largely overlooked channels other 
than the labor market through which immigration might affect perceived economic interests or substituted 
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contextual measurements of these factors, we measure citizen perceptions of an extensive set of economic 
effects. We find that for highly skilled respondents, the perceived overall economic consequences of 
immigration are affected by both labor market consequences and concern about additional taxes, with 
support for, or opposition to, additional low-skilled immigration strongly predicted by beliefs about the 
fiscal burdens that new immigrants might impose.27 Thus, when considering respondents’ overall beliefs 
regarding the net effect of immigration on household economic welfare, economic self-interest is a 
substantively important predictor of attitudes toward immigration across individuals and different types of 
immigrants. 
We estimated the conditional effects of economic and other concerns using regression 
analysis on cross-sectional data, obtaining partial correlations between these concerns and 
immigration policy attitudes. Thus, if all else equal there is a large difference in an attitude 
regarding immigration policy between those who are concerned about the fiscal burden of new 
immigrants and those who are not, regression analysis would produce a large coefficient estimate 
for an item tapping this attitude. If the observed difference in immigration attitudes across these 
two groups was caused by the difference in respondents’ conclusions regarding fiscal burden, 
then the regression estimate is a causal effect of beliefs about the fiscal burden of immigration. 
However, there are several threats to validity. 
First, we provide no model to explain variation in respondents’ beliefs. If variation on a 
particular item is correlated with an omitted factor that also affects policy attitudes, the estimated 
effect of the measured item will be biased. Second, if variation in the measured item is itself 
caused by variation in policy attitudes, then the item’s estimated effect will be biased as well. We 
address this concern by controlling for several theoretical arguments for how immigration might 
affect the economy and society, as well as attitudes toward immigration of the other skill type, 
which proxy for general attitudes toward immigration. Third, subjects may not hold actual 
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opinions on the distinct economic consequences about which we asked, but may instead provide 
responses that rationalize their broader attitudes toward immigration or immigrants of a certain 
type. That our findings persist when we examine only those whose immigration attitudes were 
measured after we assessed expectations about specific economic consequences (see footnote 10) 
provides some evidence that particular attitudes were not provided merely to justify already 
expressed policy attitudes. We acknowledge, however, that as with all observational survey 
analysis, we cannot rule out this possibility. 
The inherent limitations in demonstrating causal relationships in this context suggest one 
direction for future research. In particular, one could examine whether immigration policy 
attitudes respond to exogenous changes in economic (or other) beliefs about the consequences of 
immigration (e.g., Goldstein and Peters 2014). Another approach might involve survey 
experiments that alter subject beliefs through framing or information provision to test whether 
altered beliefs are associated with changes in immigration policy attitudes. We note, however, 
that prior research has not tested, but rather assumed, how manipulation of immigrant 
characteristics affects beliefs. 
These concerns aside, our work advances the existing literature by expanding the 
conceptualization of perceived economic self-interest beyond labor market effects to include 
citizens’ beliefs of the fiscal burden of increased numbers of immigrants, crowding in access to 
existing government services, and the costs of goods and services (which we directly measured). 
In so doing, we find that the dismissal of perceived economic self-interest as an important 
predictor of immigration policy attitudes has been premature because previous researchers have 
not actually measured citizens’ beliefs and have missed the relevant economic concerns held by 
the American public about the admission of more immigrants. In measuring beliefs, we have 
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taken an empirical strategy that adheres more closely to the underlying theoretical economic 
models considered in the literature. We leave to future work the identification of the factors that 
influence belief formation. One potential approach is to exploit differences in local-level 
immigration patterns (assuming local experiences are key information sources), though this 
would require accounting for unobserved factors that may simultaneously explain exposure to 
different immigrant populations and attitudes toward immigrants. 
Outside of immigration policy, we demonstrate the key role of measuring beliefs in order 
to properly understand the contours of public opinion. These beliefs are the key intermediary 
between models of economic (or other) effects and policy attitudes, making it essential that 
scholars identify and measure the multiple pathways by which policy choices can affect beliefs 
about salient outcomes. As social scientists increasingly turn toward experimentation to evaluate 
theoretical predictions, we must remember that experimental interventions may work through 
multiple pathways, and it is only by properly measuring intermediate beliefs that we can fully 
understand the key dynamics of individual attitudes. 
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1 As described below, we rely on self-assessed labor market skill level, as opposed to prior work 
that uses indirect proxies (e.g., education). 
2 Previous studies examine the effects of these non-labor market factors on immigration policy 
attitudes by using contextual measures (e.g., state fiscal burdens, unemployment rates) or survey-
based assessments of the consequences for the entire nation (e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; 
Hanson et al. 2007; Tingley 2013). 
3 Sniderman et al. (2004) examine perceived personal economic concerns as a whole but do not 
investigate each dimension individually. Outside the area of legal immigration, Citrin et al. 
(1990) and Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) examine perceptions of multiple economic effects of 
the changing demographic composition of California and illegal migrants, respectively. 
4 We emphasize that what matters is whether citizens perceive these economic effects, not 
whether their estimates are accurate. 
5 Outside the U.S., similar measures are differences in GDP per capita, Gini coefficients, sector-
level inflows of immigrants, tax rates, and fiscal transfers (Citrin and Sides 2008; Dancygier and 
Donnelly 2013; Helbling and Kriesi 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and 
Sinnott 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007). 
6 As we note in footnote 3, prior work considers perceptions of the multiple economic effects of 
illegal immigration or changing ethnic compositions, but none that we are aware of focuses on 
legal immigration or the distinction between highly and low-skilled legal immigrants. 
7 Sample construction is described in the Supplemental Appendix. 8,198 individuals were invited 
to take the survey, 3,428 started it, and 2,789 completed it. AAPOR response rate 5 is 34.0% and 
response rate 6 is 41.8% (American Association for Public Opinion Research 2011). 
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8 There are no substantive differences across subsequent survey items between those asked their 
opinions at the beginning and the end (we discuss this finding below and in the Supplemental 
Appendix). 
9 One potential concern is whether respondents interpret the qualifiers “highly skilled” and “low-
skilled” as proxies for immigrants from a specific country or region, or if they carry some other 
unanticipated connotation. Previous investigations (e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010) have not 
attempted to control for this possibility, but results in Table H1 of the Supplemental Appendix 
show that the treatments do appear to prime considerations other than the immigrants’ skill levels 
(namely, cultural considerations). To mitigate this effect on economic evaluations, we control for 
the cultural perceptions simultaneously manipulated based on the assigned skill level. We leave 
for future work the development of treatments that solely manipulate considerations about skill 
levels. 
10 One might be concerned that having respondents assess how increasing immigration affects 
different dimensions of economic self-interest primes them to offer assessments consistent with 
their previously solicited policy attitudes but that do not independently affect their policy 
preferences. To this we have three responses. First, asking people to think about these 
consequences reflects contemporary public discourse about immigration reform to which citizens 
are regularly exposed. Second, if these questions prompt concerns about the types of economic 
threat posed by immigration more generally, then respondent evaluations of these threats should 
be similar for highly skilled and low-skilled immigration. This is not the case, however, as we 
show below. Third, we show in the Supplemental Appendix that results are similar if we restrict 
our analysis to those asked their policy attitudes after the measures of perceived economic 
effects. 
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11 As previously discussed, other studies estimate these effects from responses to questions 
tapping sociotropic concerns. Crucially, we instead rely on beliefs about how these factors affect 
economic self-interest. At a later point in the survey, we asked about the consequences of 
increased immigration of a specific skill type for respondents’ communities and the nation as a 
whole, regardless of personal or household effects. Although the anticipated effects of increased 
immigration on changes in personal and sociotropic tax burdens are highly correlated (.7 to .8), 
the other potential economic consequences exhibit lower levels of correlation (between .4 and 
.6). As such, these evaluations are certainly correlated, but not interchangeable. 
12 We replicate previous research that uses objective measures of skill level rather than 
perceptions to measure economic self-interest, and provide discussion, in the Supplemental 
Appendix. 
13 Question wording and survey marginals appear in the Supplemental Appendix. We exclude 
respondents who answer less than four of the five questions reported in Figure 1 and replace 
remaining missing values with scale midpoints (i.e., neutral responses). Item nonresponse rates 
across treatment groups are statistically indistinguishable. 
14 All p-values are two-tailed. 
15 Summary statistics appear in the Supplemental Appendix. Performing the analyses in columns 
(1)-(4) for the entire sample (i.e., not only those in the labor market) yields a modestly smaller 
correlation between labor market concerns and overall household economic effects with respect 
to highly skilled immigrants, but the remainder of the statistically significant estimates for 
perceptions about immigration vary only slightly (see the Supplemental Appendix). 
16 Survey marginals appear in the Supplemental Appendix. 
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17 Low-skilled respondents might perceive labor market threats from highly skilled immigrants 
because they may believe these immigrants would have difficulty obtaining highly skilled 
employment and take a low-skilled job, or they could make it possible to substitute technology 
for low-skilled jobs. 
18 One potential concern with respondents’ self-assessed skill levels and reports of attitudes 
toward immigrants of different skill types is that individuals may use the terms “highly skilled” 
and “low-skilled” in ways different than defined by the theory. To address this concern, we 
trained a random subsample of respondents about the meaning of these terms prior to classifying 
their own skill levels or providing their immigration attitudes. The correlation between self-
classification and perceived labor market threat from similarly skilled immigrants is significantly 
stronger for these respondents, providing even more support for the argument that citizens 
perceive greater threat from similarly skilled immigrants (see the Supplemental Appendix). 
19 Under this restriction, low-skilled respondents have labor market threat scores .06 units higher 
for low-skilled immigrants than for highly skilled immigrants (p<.05), while highly skilled 
respondents have labor market threat scores .04 units smaller for low-skilled immigrants than for 
highly skilled immigrants (p<.1). See the replication materials. 
20 Prior work sometimes proxies for skill levels with education. In the Supplemental Appendix, 
we replicate columns (5)-(8) of Table 2, partitioning workers by education level. 
21 This test was performed by estimating a model pooling the column (7) and (8) samples and 
adding a treatment indicator and interactions between that indicator and all model covariates (see 
the replication materials). 
22 See the Supplemental Appendix for summary statistics. 
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23 Question wording and response options for the sociotropic and cultural items appear in the 
Supplemental Appendix, where we also present the effect of assigned immigrant type on each of 
the six cultural threat items. Results are robust to replacing the cultural threat factor score with a 
single cultural threat question asked elsewhere in the survey (see the Supplemental Appendix). 
24 Restricting the sample to respondents asked their policy attitudes near the beginning of the 
survey produces highly similar results (see the Supplemental Appendix). 
25 In a model with only the demographic measures and the question placement indicator from 
column (1), the R-squared is .19. Including the single household economic effects item increases 
the R-squared by .25.  
26 In a model including only the demographic measures and the column (4) question placement 
indicator, the R-squared is .19. Including the single household economic effects item increases 
the R-squared by .30. 
27 Highly skilled workers may pay more in federal taxes than they receive in federal benefits, but 
natives may believe that at the local level highly skilled immigrants will receive greater benefits 
than covered by their taxes, especially if they are perceived to have larger families that place 
greater demands on local services. 
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Table 1: Selected Studies that Seek to Assess the Role of Personal Economic Self-interest in Explaining Immigration Policy Preferences 
Study 
(A) 
Measure One or More 
Dimensions of Personal 
Economic Effects 
(B) 
Distinguish Preferences for 
Highly vs. Low-Skilled 
Immigrants 
(C) 
Distinguish Cultural, 
Sociotropic Economic, and 
Dimensions of Personal 
Economic Effects by 
Immigrant Skill 
(D) 
Measure Perception of Labor 
Market Skill 
Espenshade and 
Hempstead (1996) N N N Indirect (Education & Income) 
Citrin et al. (1997) N N N Indirect (Occupation Category & Employment Status) 
Bauer et al. (2000) N N N Indirect (Education) 
Burns and Gimpel (2000) N N N Indirect (Personal Economic Evaluations) 
Chandler and Tsai (2001) N N N Indirect (Income) 
Kessler (2001) N N N Indirect (Education & Average Occupation Wage) 
Scheve and Slaughter 
(2001) N N N 
Indirect (Education & Average 
Occupation Wage) 
McLaren (2003) N N N Indirect (Income & Job Security) 
Hooghe and Marks (2004) N N N Indirect (Education & Occupation) 
Sniderman et al. (2004) 
Y (Single Item: "I am afraid 
that my economic prospects 
will get worse because of 
minorities.") 
Y N Indirect (Personal Economic Prospects) 
Dustmann and Preston 
(2006) N N N 
Indirect (Education & Labor 
Market Status) 
Mayda (2006) N N N Indirect (Education) 
O'Rourke and Sinnott 
(2006) N N N Indirect (Occupation) 
Dustmann and Preston 
(2007) N N N 
Indirect (Education, Occupation 
Category, Job Security, & Ease 
of Finding Job) 
Hainmueller and Hiscox 
(2007) N Indirect (Education) N 
Indirect (Education & 
Occupation Category) 
Hanson et al. (2007) N N N Indirect (Education & Income) 
McClaren and Johnson 
(2007) N N N 
Indirect (Education, Income, & 
Occupation Category) 
Sides and Citrin (2007) N N N Indirect (Income) 
Kinder and Kam (2009) N N N Indirect (Occupation Category) 
Haimueller and Hiscox 
(2010) N Y N Indirect (Education) 
Card et al. (2011) N N N N 
Dancygier and Donnelly 
(2013) N N N Indirect (Employment Sector) 
Iyengar et al. (2013) N Indirect (Education & Specific Occupation) N 
Indirect (Education and 
Occupation Category) 
Malhotra et al. (2013) N Y (Ask Only About Highly Skilled Immigrants) 
Indirect (Ask Cultural 
Questions Only About Indian 
Immigrants) 
Indirect (Occupation Category 
& Self-Report Employment in 
High-Tech Industry) 
Tingley (2013) N N N Indirect (Education) 
Helbling and Kriesi (2014) N Y Y (Cultural Factors Only) Indirect (Education & Income) 
Hainmueller and Hopkins 
(2015) N 
Indirect (Education & 
Profession) N 
Indirect (Education & 
Profession) 
Hainmueller et al. (2015) N Y Y (Cultural Factors Only) Indirect (Education & Profession) 
Note: Order is chronological. List is derived from Malhotra et al. (2013) and updated. 
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Table 2: Predicting Summary Economic Evaluations with Dimensions of Economic Assessments 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
Respondent Type      Labor Market Subsample (Respondent or Spouse/Partner Working or Looking for Work) 
Full Labor Market Subsample 
 
Highly Skilled Subsample 
 
Low-skilled Subsample 
Immigrant Type      Highly Skilled Immigrants 
 
Low-skilled Immigrants 
 
Highly Skilled 
Immigrants 
 
Low-skilled 
Immigrants 
 
Highly Skilled 
Immigrants 
 
Low-skilled 
Immigrants 
  Scaled (0-1) 
Standardized 
Measure   Scaled (0-1) 
Standardized 
Measure   Scaled (0-1)   Scaled (0-1)   Scaled (0-1)   Scaled (0-1) 
Immigrant of type will 
                  Increase household chance of 0.262 0.332 
 
0.112 0.143 
 
0.221 
 
0.030 
 
0.351 
 
0.249 
          job or wage loss [0.040]*** [0.051]*** 
 
[0.044]* [0.057]* 
 
[0.050]*** 
 
[0.044] 
 
[0.058]*** 
 
[0.069]*** 
     Increase household taxes 0.249 0.238 
 
0.438 0.408 
 
0.251 
 
0.419 
 
0.174 
 
0.413 
 
[0.060]*** [0.058]*** 
 
[0.084]*** [0.078]*** 
 
[0.078]** 
 
[0.085]*** 
 
[0.089] 
 
[0.103]*** 
    Reduce household access to 0.079 0.078 
 
0.086 0.084 
 
0.142 
 
0.016 
 
-0.034 
 
0.163 
          government services [0.062] [0.061] 
 
[0.050] [0.048] 
 
[0.083] 
 
[0.070] 
 
[0.063] 
 
[0.062]** 
     Increase household costs of 0.045 0.039 
 
0.063 0.057 
 
0.025 
 
0.147 
 
0.075 
 
-0.029 
          goods and services [0.078] [0.067] 
 
[0.066] [0.060] 
 
[0.122] 
 
[0.075]* 
 
[0.076] 
 
[0.100] 
Demographic Controls 
                  Female (Yes = 1) 0.058 0.233 
 
0.049 0.184 
 
0.106 
 
0.035 
 
-0.023 
 
0.078 
 
[0.028]* [0.113]* 
 
[0.021]* [0.078]* 
 
[0.041]** 
 
[0.025] 
 
[0.024] 
 
[0.033]* 
    Age (in Years) 0.001 0.006 
 
0.002 0.009 
 
0.002 
 
0.005 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
[0.001] [0.003] 
 
[0.001]*** [0.003]*** 
 
[0.001] 
 
[0.001]*** 
 
[0.001] 
 
[0.001] 
    Black (Yes = 1) 0.013 0.052 
 
-0.022 -0.083 
 
0.026 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.030 
 
-0.029 
 
[0.058] [0.232] 
 
[0.050] [0.185] 
 
[0.074] 
 
[0.063] 
 
[0.076] 
 
[0.073] 
    White (Yes = 1) 0.016 0.066 
 
-0.007 -0.027 
 
0.036 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.008 
 
[0.045] [0.179] 
 
[0.035] [0.130] 
 
[0.052] 
 
[0.038] 
 
[0.066] 
 
[0.072] 
    Hispanic (Yes = 1) -0.025 -0.099 
 
-0.081 -0.300 
 
-0.030 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.154 
 
[0.052] [0.211] 
 
[0.046] [0.171] 
 
[0.064] 
 
[0.046] 
 
[0.069] 
 
[0.093] 
    Education (0=No HS Degree -0.030 -0.120 
 
-0.015 -0.057 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.017 
 
0.020 
         to 3=BA or Higher) [0.016] [0.066] 
 
[0.011] [0.042] 
 
[0.021] 
 
[0.014] 
 
[0.017] 
 
[0.021] 
     Ideology (Very Liberal to 0.039 0.159 
 
-0.009 -0.035 
 
0.058 
 
-0.009 
 
0.019 
 
-0.011 
          Very Conservative, 5-pt.) [0.015]** [0.060]** 
 
[0.013] [0.048] 
 
[0.025]* 
 
[0.017] 
 
[0.015] 
 
[0.015] 
     Partisanship (Strong Democrat to -0.009 -0.034 
 
0.017 0.063 
 
-0.013 
 
0.022 
 
0.003 
 
0.014 
          Strong Republican, 7-pt.) [0.009] [0.036] 
 
[0.007]* [0.027]* 
 
[0.013] 
 
[0.009]* 
 
[0.009] 
 
[0.010] 
Constant 0.074 -0.481 
 
0.050 -0.407 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.039 
 
0.232 
 
0.059 
  [0.086] [0.266]   [0.065] [0.219]   [0.112]   [0.080]   [0.093]*   [0.071] 
Observations 581 581 
 
585 585 
 
356 
 
371 
 
221 
 
209 
R-squared 0.406 0.406   0.456 0.456   0.414   0.452   0.478   0.575 
Note: Dependent variable is summary measure of household economic effects for admitting additional immigrants of specific type, scored so that more negative effects are larger values. 
Table entries are OLS coefficient estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. Analysis uses analytic weights. In columns labeled "Scaled (0-1)," economic attitude items 
are scored 0-1. In columns labeled "Standardized Measure," economic attitude items are recoded to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 within sample used for that column's model 
estimates. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 
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Table 3: Predicting Overall Immigration Policy Attitudes by Immigrant Type with Personal Economic, Sociotropic Economic, and Cultural Concerns 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Opposition to Admitting More Highly 
Skilled Immigrants (0-1) 
Opposition to Admitting More Low-skilled 
Immigrants (0-1) 
Pooled, Opposition to 
Admitting Immigrants of 
Type (0-1) 
Immigrant of assigned type will hurt 0.773 0.229 0.090 0.765 0.292 0.240 
 
0.269 
     overall household finances (0-1) [0.044]*** [0.062]*** [0.056] [0.040]*** [0.055]*** [0.052]*** 
 
[0.042]*** 
Negative overall economic effects 
 
0.335 0.293 
 
0.503 0.393 
 
0.406 
     for nation (0-1) 
 
[0.064]*** [0.054]*** 
 
[0.052]*** [0.051]*** 
 
[0.045]*** 
Cultural threat index 
 
0.533 0.412 
 
0.179 0.089 
 
0.363 
  
[0.074]*** [0.061]*** 
 
[0.053]*** [0.049] 
 
[0.050]*** 
Oppose admitting more low-skilled 
  
0.392 
          immigrants (0-1) 
  
[0.037]*** 
     Oppose admitting more highly skilled 
     
0.299 
       immigrants (0-1) 
     
[0.034]*** 
  Immigrant is low-skilled (Yes = 1) 
      
0.140 0.046 
       
[0.021]*** [0.015]** 
Policy attitude measured at end of 0.037 0.048 0.042 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.038 0.048 
     survey (Yes=1) [0.028] [0.023]* [0.018]* [0.023] [0.020] [0.018] [0.022] [0.016]** 
Female (Yes = 1) 0.026 0.042 0.045 -0.033 -0.037 -0.055 0.033 0.000 
 
[0.026] [0.021]* [0.018]* [0.021] [0.018]* [0.016]*** [0.021] [0.014] 
Age (in Years) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
[0.001]* [0.001]*** [0.001]** [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]** [0.000]*** 
Black (Yes = 1) 0.051 0.053 0.035 -0.035 0.015 -0.016 -0.019 0.047 
 
[0.063] [0.046] [0.038] [0.048] [0.042] [0.040] [0.043] [0.034] 
White (Yes = 1) 0.039 0.005 -0.020 0.019 0.022 0.007 0.013 0.022 
 
[0.052] [0.037] [0.030] [0.040] [0.032] [0.033] [0.037] [0.026] 
Hispanic (Yes = 1) 0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.060 -0.021 -0.031 -0.118 0.000 
 
[0.061] [0.043] [0.039] [0.046] [0.034] [0.032] [0.041]** [0.031] 
Education (0 = No HS Degree to -0.085 -0.055 -0.043 -0.039 -0.028 -0.009 -0.103 -0.043 
     3 = BA or Higher) [0.014]*** [0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]** [0.010] [0.012]*** [0.008]*** 
Ideology (Very Liberal to Very 0.012 -0.015 -0.025 0.024 0.002 0.006 0.040 -0.005 
     Conservative, 5-pt.) [0.014] [0.013] [0.011]* [0.011]* [0.010] [0.009] [0.012]*** [0.008] 
Partisanship (Strong Democrat to 0.007 0.001 -0.006 0.009 -0.004 0.003 0.022 -0.000 
     Strong Republican, 7-pt.) [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006]*** [0.005] 
Constant 0.026 -0.077 -0.105 0.105 0.045 0.023 0.424 -0.061 
 
[0.085] [0.066] [0.055] [0.058] [0.050] [0.050] [0.066]*** [0.045] 
         Observations 779 779 779 766 766 766 1,545 1,545 
R-squared 0.441 0.609 0.688 0.488 0.605 0.669 0.200 0.607 
Note: Dependent variable is summary measure of opposition to admitting immigrants of specific type, scored so that strong opposition is coded 1 and strong support is 
coded 0. Table entries are OLS coefficient estimates with robust (Huber/White) standard errors in brackets. Analysis uses analytic weights. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05. 
37 
 
 
Figure 1. Average evaluations of personal economic effects of additional immigration by immigrant type 
 
Note: p-values are comparisons between highly and low-skilled immigrant conditions. Numbers on bars are 
average scale scores. Capped lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Weighted analysis. 
Unemployment/Wage loss measure presented only for labor market subsample. 
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Figure 2. Evaluations of personal economic effects of immigrants by own skill and immigrant 
skill level 
 
Note: p-values are comparisons between highly and low-skilled immigrant conditions. Numbers on bars are 
average scale scores. Capped lines denote 95% confidence intervals. Weighted analysis. 
Unemployment/Wage loss measure presented only for labor market subsample. 
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Panel B: Low-Skilled Respondents
